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Abstract—Traditional database access control mechanisms use
role based methods, with generally row based and attribute based
constraints for granularity, and privacy is achieved mainly by
using views. However if only a set of views according to policy
are made accessible to users, then this set should be checked
against the policy for the whole probable query history. The aim
of this work is to define a proactive decomposition algorithm
according to the attribute based policy rules and build a secure
logical schema in which relations are decomposed into several
ones in order to inhibit joins or inferences that may violate
predefined privacy constraints. The attributes whose association
should not be inferred, are defined as having security dependency
among them and they form a new kind of context dependent
attribute based policy rule named as security dependent set. The
decomposition algorithm works on a logical schema with given
security dependent sets and aims to prohibit the inference of the
association among the elements of these sets. It is also proven that
the decomposition technique generates a secure logical schema
that is in compliance with the given security dependent set
constraints.
I. INTRODUCTION
Business technology era has increased the importance of
logical data storage and retrieval from the point of security,
since many users and roles with different access privileges act
in the same database environment. As an important topic in
security, granularity is also essential in database access control
methods. Traditional database security approaches mainly use
relation based action rules for users such as allowing querying
but disallowing updating the relation and sometimes they also
try to define policy rules on attributes to increase granularity
[1]. These approaches have very simple purpose; that is, to
determine whether to grant or deny the access, based on the
predefined constraints related to the role of the user. Especially
for the attribute based access control; the attributes that are
going to be related with each other by executing a query, also
taking query history into consideration, are the main factor in
making the grant or deny decision of the query.
For example, let′s consider a relation:
STUDENT = (id, email, name, surname,
address, age, gender)
on which a survey about the characteristics of students are
being carried out. As an example, the extraction of email
and gender relationship should be forbidden in order to
preserve the assumed privacy of a student. In addition to that,
if id and email fields are two keys and id is selected as
primary key, probable join queries should also be checked in
order to guarantee that email and gender fields cannot be
related with each other by the help of the id attribute. For
this case, decomposing the STUDENT relation into two views
as:
STUDENT1 = (id, name, surname, address,
age, gender)
STUDENT2 = (id, email, name, surname,
address, age)
is an example of faulty decomposition since email and
gender can be related as follows.
SELECT s1.gender, s2.email
FROM STUDENT1 s1, STUDENT2 s2
WHERE s1.id = s2.id
To prevent this kind of queries, a correct decomposition
can be given as:
STUDENT1 = (name, surname, address,
age, gender)
STUDENT2 = (email, name, surname,
address, age)
STUDENT3 = (id, name, surname, address,
age)
Note that STUDENT1 is a keyless relation as it is usual
in views and the situation will be discussed in the following
sections of the paper. In addition to that, it is assumed there
exists no functional dependency other than the ones which
make email and id candidate keys for the relation. By
this decomposition, the queries which relates email and
gender cannot achieve the inference of association among
the attributes, since equijoins on keys cannot be done by
decomposed relations.
As in this example, a view based solution can be generated
to satisfy privacy policy, which is very popular approach
in enterprise database systems. There can be several policy
rules, and views should be constructed in order to satisfy
all constraints of these policies. The need for defining dif-
ferent external layers for different access control policies has
increased by web based data sharing trend [2]. Therefore, a
formal approach is needed to build a secure external layer
by decomposing the relations into sub relations according
to policy rules, in order to generate relevant secure logical
schema.
Most of the research on this kind of security (access control)
is mainly focused on dynamic mechanisms employing query
investigation or modification methods, and by also tracking
the query history [1], [3]–[7]. On the other hand, the strategy
used in this paper is to decompose the relation into views in
advance, for preventing the time spent by query modification
or history tracking operations which may be costly in high
utilized database systems [8]. To the best of our knowledge,
this is the first attempt in the literature to handle privacy for
context dependent attribute based access control by a proactive
approach. Our method can be easily adapted for validating
existing external schema against given attribute based policy
rules. The proactive decomposition method described in this
paper can easily be combined with other constraints such as
row based policy rules during implementation. In addition to
that the method can be used in a ”Private Record Matching”
engine when required context dependent attribute sets are
supplied [9].
In the rest of this paper, we first present a formal method
to define secure logical schema for preserving context depen-
dent attribute based privacy, then we define a decomposition
algorithm that guarantees to produce a secure logical schema.
A detailed real life example is also given to clearly show the
steps of the algorithm and use of the decomposed relations in
sample applications.
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the
related works in the field of security and privacy in databases.
Then, the Section 3 gives the preliminaries and definitions
used through the rest of the paper. Section 4 presents the
decomposition algorithm that satisfies the access policies,
and the proof of the algorithm. The next section, Section 5,
contains a real life example for demonstration of the algorithm
and Section 6 briefly discusses the future work. Finally Section
7 contains the conclusion.
II. RELATED WORK
The field of database security is very popular, and several
works in this field have influenced the idea proposed in this
paper [1], [3]–[7], [10]–[21]. The approach of updating the
query dynamically depending on the context and the policy
has been studied for a long time in the literature [4]. In this
method, the query can be modified by adding predicates and
the main purpose is the row based security. Adding more
predicates to where clause can only restrict the rows extracted
by the query [4]. Actually the security mechanism in [4] gives
user a set of views which are permitted to be queried and
then performs row based elimination by adding predicates
whose idea can be treated as an additional functionality for
the work in this paper. However another work, [5], states
that the former algorithm is not maximal and limits some
permitted answers. In [5] some flexibility has been added as
the query may depend on any view or sub view or meta-
relations. That means extra work should be conducted in
order to find which permitted views are involved. These two
approaches may have performance problems and modifying
the query can be costly [8], nevertheless it should be noted that
their query modification strategies are done mainly for row
based access control, whereas this paper focuses on context
dependent attribute based access control in a proactive manner.
In addition to this, Oracle presents Virtual Private Database
term [7] and performs the security totally by query modi-
fication on real relations. The modification can be as row
based by adding predicates or column based by making null of
the unwanted attributes. Bertino [13] calls this type of query
modification approaches as Truman Models [12], since they
answer each time, nevertheless the answer may not be maximal
because of restrictions. These models have simple attribute
based policy rules as just checking the existence of attributes in
the query result. Beside this, data perturbation [17] is another
run-time consuming method and may be used for Truman
Models. In addition to that, k-anonymity term [3] has been
proposed to divide the relation to views which are targeted
not to extract ”id”s. Moreover the security policy need not to
be satisfying the anonymity only; for instance one can define
a policy rule as gender and address should not be obtained
together as even both of them is not adequate for identification
[16].
Furthermore, Purpose Oriented Access Control scheme [10]
offers role - purpose - column mapping, however two purposes
may serve to another unwanted purpose. For instance let a,
b, c to be attributes and purpose-1 needs a, b; purpose-2
needs a, c and non-existing and unwanted purpose-3 needs
b, c. In this example first two purposes can serve to the
unwanted third purpose. That example presents the notion
of query history [18] whose deep investigation makes the
computation costly. To get rid of these, attribute mutability
term [11] provides a mechanism as Chinese-Wall method [14]
with historical data, but performance requirements may be
again critical.
Beside this, Non-Truman models have been proposed [12]
which reject the unauthorized query according to the autho-
rized views. Hippocratic databases [6] combine many security
issues stated in this section however the addressed problem in
this paper is a bit different. The main problem is to maintain
security and privacy in all these works; nevertheless, dynamic
security modeling with query modification, attribute mutation,
historical query tracking or grant/reject mechanism may have
performance problems because of their run time executions.
This paper constructs a proactive security mechanism as
building an external layer with a secure logical schema to user
by a decomposition algorithm in which user is free to query
anything on decomposed relations. The term Attribute-Based
in this paper is used for the ability of defining the access
control rules on the attributes of relations. The same term
has been used differently in [21] to build the access control
with the help of dedicated attributes. It is important to note
that the notion of modeling access control rules on attributes
according to the application semantics is another important
work discussed in [22] which is not in the scope of this paper.
The most relevant study, targeted a similar problem with
this work, is reducing inference control to access control [1].
However their solution labels the normalized schema relations
and the solution is not proactive, only more efficient than query
controlling.
III. PRELIMINARIES AND PROBLEM DEFINITION
In this section, we give the basic terms and concepts used
in the paper. This paper has two main objectives, namely,
formally defining a secure logical schema which is in com-
pliance with the given security constraints (security dependent
sets), and developing a decomposition algorithm which divides
relations into sub-relations to be able to satisfy the security
constraints. The main reason for decomposition is to prevent
obtaining securely dependent attributes together directly in a
relation or through a join.
Therefore, first, the definition of the logical schema is
given in terms of two sets as relational schema and (non-
reflexive and non-partial) functional dependencies. After that,
the closures of relations and functional dependencies (again
non-reflexive and non-partial) are defined. The closure of
relation schema is very important, since it describes how new
relations can be generated using only equijoins on foreign
keys. Moreover, the closure of functional dependencies is used
to define identifiers for attributes, how they can be inferred,
and how two or more attributes can be associated with each
other. Combining these definitions, we then define a secure
logical schema, which simply prevents obtaining the attributes
of each given security dependent set together by joins. We
also prove that secure logical schema guarantees that it is not
possible to obtain any association among the set of attributes
of security dependent set.
Following these, we define a decomposition operation which
decomposes a logical schema according to a given secure
dependent sets in order to form a secure logical schema. After-
wards, we prove that the new schema obtained by employing
the decomposition operation is secure logical schema, which
means that it is not possible to associate attributes of secure
dependent sets by joins using the relations constructed after
the decomposition. By this way, the inference of association
of the attributes together in each security dependent set can
be prevented.
Definition 1 (Relational Schema). A relation schema is
defined a set of attribute names concatenated with relation
name (using underscore) in order to prevent the vagueness
caused by having same attribute name in different relations.
For the sake of simplicity, relation schema is referred as
relation and the concatenation on attribute names will not be
shown unless needed.
For example a relation
USERS={id_users,name_users,surname_users,
email_users}
is defined as a set of concatenated attribute names. Using this
definition, it is guaranteed that all attribute names in a database
will be unique owing to unique relation names by default.
Definition 2 (Logical Schema). A logical schema for a
database is defined as a tuple L = (R,F) such as;
• R is defined as set of all relation schemas in a database.
• F is defined as set of functional dependencies among
attributes in all relation schemas in R excluding reflexive
and partial functional dependencies.
Since a foreign and relevant key in two different relations
have different names according to the definition of relational
schema, the functional dependency in between them is not
treated as reflexive and should be in F as given in the
example below. It should be noted that this kind of functional
dependencies have a special importance since they are used
to perfom equijoins on keys while inference, which will be
discussed below. It is important to point out that the functional
dependencies which were lost while building R, are not in the
scope of this paper; together with the key like behavior for a
non-key attribute seen statistically through data for a schema.
For example,
R = {USERS,LOGS} as
USERS = {id_users, name_users,
surname_users}
LOGS = {userid_logs, action_logs,
date_logs}
userid_logs is a foreign key referencing
USERS(id_users).
F =


(userid logs → id users),
(id users → userid logs),
(id users→ name users),
(id users→ surname users),
(userid logs→ action logs),
(userid logs→ date logs)


The functional dependencies given in bold expresses the
dependency between original key and a foreign key.
Using the join operation, the new relations can be obtained
from the relations of logical schema. Similarly, the properties
of functional dependencies can be used to generate new
functional dependencies from the existing ones. Below, we
define two closures for these two.
Definition 3 (F+: Closure of F ). Closure set of given F
that can be obtained by using the properties of functional
dependencies [23], excluding reflexive and partial functional
dependencies.
Definition 4 (R+: Closure of R). Closure of R is defined
as R+, composing all probable relation schemas obtained
by performing any database query over R for which join
operations used in the query should only be equijoins on
foreign keys (named meaningful join thereafter) in order not
to produce spurious tuples.
For example, by using the sample decomposed relations
given in introduction section:
STUDENT1 = (name, surname, address,
age, gender)
STUDENT2 = (email, name, surname,
address, age)
the query which produces spurious tuples can be given as:
SELECT *
FROM STUDENT1 s1, STUDENT2 s2
WHERE s1.name = s2.name
The join operation is an equijoin but not on keys, therefore
spurious tuples are generated by associating different students
having the same name.
Let UR be union of all attributes existing in all relations of
R (i.e., UR =
⋃
Ri∈R
{ x | x ∈ Ri }). Rather than defining
which relations can be constructed from R as subsets of UR,
we can specify the set of attributes that cannot be obtained
together in R+ as follows:
Property of R+: An attribute set A cannot be subset of
any derived relation schema in R+, if and only if, A cannot be
a subset of existing relation schema or cannot be functionally
dependent to any set of attributes in UR so it becomes
impossible to relate with equijoins on foreign keys by the
definition of R+. Note that, according to Definition 2 if there
is a foreign key relationship, then it is represented as functional
dependency as ((Ai → Aj) ∈ F). Since all meaningful
joins can only be executed using this kind of functional
dependencies, the following logical formula expresses that a
set of attributes A cannot be a subset of any relation in R+
if and only if, there is no functional dependency relationship
to A in F+ and there is no R containing A.
∀Rk ∈ R
+, ∀A ⊆ UR[A 6⊆ Rk ⇔ ∀Rj ∈ R(A 6⊆ Rj)
∧∀Ai ⊆ UR((Ai → A) /∈ F
+)]
(1)
As it can be seen from above definitions, there is a strong
condition which says that in order not to be able to obtain
a subset of attributes from a logical schema it should not be
possible to perform a meaningful join. In order to perform
meaningful join; foreign keys are used, and they correspond
to functional dependencies. Therefore, we need the following
definitions to represent these relationships.
Definition 5 (Set of Identifier Sets). The set of identifier set
of an attribute α for a given F , as iFα , is defined as follows:
iFα =
{
x
∣∣ x 6⊇ {α} ∧ (x→ α) ∈ F+ } (2)
Each element of iFα is also called as identifier set of attibute
α.
For example,
α = name
F+ =


id→ name,
id→ surname,
id→ age,
id→ email,
email→ name,
email→ surname


iFα = {{id}, {email}}
The definition could be simply extended for an attribute set
A as follows:
IFA =
{
x
∣∣ x 6⊇ A ∧ (x→ A) ∈ F+ } (3)
These two definitions can be related as for an attribute set
A, as IFA contains the shared elements in iFα for all α which
are attributes in A.
IFA =
{
x
∣∣ ∀α ∈ A(x ∈ iFα ) } (4)
Identifiable Property: Each attribute of an identifiable set
(i.e, (IFA 6= ∅)), should be in the same relational schema with at
least one of its identifier set. In other words, for a L = (R,F);
∀A ⊆ UR(I
F
A 6= ∅ ⇔
∀α ∈ A, ∃Ri ∈ R, ∃D ∈ i
F
α ((α ∪D) ⊆ Ri))
(5)
The same property can be thought as it is impossible to
identify an attribute in a logical schema if the attribute does not
have any identifier set in its relation schema, which makes it
impossible to discover other identifier sets by using meaningful
joins. This issue is also a matter of database normalization
however in this paper no assumption about the normal form
of database has been done.
Definition 6 (Inferability). A set of attributes A1 ⊆ UR can
be inferable from a set of attributes A2 ⊆ UR for a given
L = (R,F), shown as A1
F
⇒ A2, as defined below.
∀A1∀A2((A1
F
⇒ A2)⇔ ((A1 → A2) ∈ F
+)) (6)
The definition of inferability is given by using closure set
of functional dependencies since relation based key constraints
may not be adequate as there may be functional dependencies
among non-prime attributes in a schema which is not normal-
ized.
Definition 7 (Inference of Association among a Set of
Attributes). For a given L = (R,F), the inference of asso-
ciation among a set of attributes A ⊆ UR ,shown as XL(A),
means that either A should be inferable from a subset of UR
or be subset of any existing relation schema in order to be
associated. More formally:
XL(A)⇔ ∃Ai ⊆ UR(Ai
F
⇒ A) ∨ ∃Ri ∈ R(A ⊆ Ri) (7)
In this paper, the set of attributes are defined as to have
security dependency among them if the inference of associa-
tion among them should be prevented. In addition to that, the
purpose of this paper is to inhibit the inference of association
among a given subset of UR with at least two attributes (each
named a security dependent set thereafter) for a logical
schema L = (R,F) by building a secure logical schema.
Definition 8 (Secure Logical Schema). A secure logical
schema is a logical schema LsecS = (R,F) such that for a
given set of security dependent sets S, there should not be
any relation in R+, containing the attributes of any set in S.
Formally:
LsecS ⇔ ∀Si ∈ S, ∄Ri ∈ R
+(Si ⊆ Ri) (8)
It should be emphasized that by the definition of R+, only
meaningful joins are taken into consideration as queries should
only have equijoins on foreign keys and by this way spurious
tuples cannot be generated.
By the definition of secure logical schema, it can be stated
that the inference of association among attributes of each
security dependent set is impossible with a secure logical
schema since the attributes of any security dependent sets
cannot be functionally dependent to any subset of attributes in
logical schema (excluding reflexive and partial dependencies
as given in Definition 2) or in the same relation as given as a
theorem below.
Theorem 1. The inference of association among attributes of
each security dependent set cannot be performed in secure
logical schemas; that is,
∀Si ∈ S(¬XLsec
S
(Si)) (9)
Proof: The formal proof given in Appendix briefly states
that in order to perform the disallowed inference, either the
attributes should be in the same relation or a meaningful join
should be done for an inter relation inference as both cases
are impossible because of secure logical schema definition.
The next step is to define transformation of a logical schema
to a secure logical schema for given security dependency sets.
Definition 9 (Secure Decomposition). A secure decompo-
sition is decomposition of L = (R,F) according to the set
of security dependency sets S to a new logical schema
L
′
S = (R
′,F ′) , having the following features:
1) Any attribute should not be lost after decomposition. In
other words:
UR = UR′ (10)
2) The new set of functional dependencies should be subset
of existing set of functional dependencies as there can’t
be any new functional dependency moreover a loss in
existing functional dependencies is expected to inhibit
the inference of associations among the elements of
security dependent sets.
(F ′ ⊆ F) ∧ (F ′
+
⊆ F+) (11)
3) Any of the decomposed relations should not be a super-
set of any security dependent set.
∀Si ∈ S, ∄Ri ∈ R
′(Si ⊆ Ri) (12)
4) Any of the attributes in a security dependent set should
not coexist in the same decomposed relation with any
of its identifier set.
∀Si ∈ S, ∀Ri ∈ R
′, ∀σ ∈ Si, ∄τ ∈ i
F
σ (({σ} ∪ τ) ⊆ Ri)
(13)
The fourth property of secure decomposition is a strong
requirement since it makes all the attributes in any security
dependent set, uninferrable after the decomposition. It should
be noted that this property is a requirement for a totally
proactive solution. If any mechanism intends to have proactive
and run time components together, then this requirement can
be relaxed.
The aim of the secure decomposition is to transform a
logical schema to a secure logical schema by the help of
security dependency sets, which is given as a theorem below.
Theorem 2. If L′S = (R′,F ′) is the logical schema obtained
after performing secure decomposition to L = (R,F) with
the set of security dependency sets S, then L′S is a LsecS .
Proof: The formal proof given in Appendix briefly states
that in order not to be a secure logical schema, a security
dependent set should be inferable or should be a part of an
original relation. The former is impossible as the attributes of
security dependent sets cannot be in the same relation with any
of their identifier sets by the fourth property of the definition
of secure decomposition. It is also impossible for the latter
due to the third property of secure decomposition.
IV. DECOMPOSITION ALGORITHM
The main purpose of the decomposition algorithm is to
achieve the secure decomposition (Definition 9) which is
defined as resulting in a secure logical schema. In order to
satisfy the goal, it is clear that the elements of each security
dependent set should not be in the same sub-relation obtained
after the decomposition of original relations. Furthermore, it
should not be possible to meaningfully join two sub-relations
containing securely dependent attributes separately. Below
we define an algorithm which exhaustively generates all the
subsets of the attributes of all relations and eliminates the ones
that do not satisfy the conditions mentioned above. After that,
it also eliminates redundant sub-relations.
Secure decomposition algorithm for the L = (R,F) with
the given security dependencies set S is given in Algorithm
1.
Algorithm 1 Decomposition Algorithm
Input:
L: logical schema as (R,F),
S: set of security dependent sets for L
Output:
PR: set of maximal subsets of R according to S
1: begin
2: PR = ∅
3: for each Rx in R do
4: PRx = Power Set of Rx
5: for each Si in S do
6: for each Zi in PRx do
7: if Si ⊆ Zi then
8: remove Zi from PRx
9: end if
10: for each α in Si do
11: for each λ in iFα do
12: if ({α} ∪ λ) ⊆ Zi then
13: remove Zi from PRx
14: end if
15: end for
16: end for
17: end for
18: end for
19: for each Vi in PRx do
20: for each Wi in PRx do
21: if Vi ⊆ Wi then
22: remove Vi from PRx
23: end if
24: end for
25: end for
26: PR = PR ∪ PRx
27: end for
28: return PR
29: end
The secure decomposing algorithm works as follows:
For all relational schemas in R,
1) Firstly, powerset of the a relational schema is generated,
which is called as PRx in the algorithm (line (4)).
2) Then, for each security dependency set in S (line (5))
each element of PRx (line (6)) is processed. The set is
eliminated if:
• it contains all attributes of that security dependent
set together (lines (7-9)), or,
• it contains one of the attributes of the security
dependent set with the attribute’s any identifier set
together (lines (10-16))
3) After that, among the remaining subsets; redundant ones
(used for unnecessary sub-relations composed by other
sub-relations) are also eliminated (lines (19-25)).
The elimination strategy is aimed to create a secure logical
schema. It is important to note that all of the work in this paper
is concentrated on security dependent sets. Actually there may
be some basic policy rules as a single attribute should not be
accessed in any context and these basic cases can be easily
handled with simple extensions to the algorithm. However it
is left as a future work to define a complete mechanism.
Theorem 3. Decomposition algorithm performs secure de-
composition on given L = (R,F) for a given S.
Proof: For the proof, we should revisit the properties of
secure decomposition given in Definition 9. Each explanation
is used in the same item number with the definition.
1) Any attribute cannot be lost after decomposition al-
gorithm as the algorithm cannot remove one element
subsets of each relation since;
• Security dependency sets should have at least two
elements by its definition and cannot be included by
a one element subset.
• An attribute in a security dependent set cannot be
its identifier as reflexive functional dependencies are
excluded in the definition of F+ and the set of
identifier set thereby. So again, at least two element
set (attribute and its identifier) cannot be subset of
one element subset.
2) Any new functional dependencies cannot be presented
besides some existing ones may be lost because some
subsets of each relation schema are eliminated.
3) Subsets containing security dependent sets are elimi-
nated (lines (7-9)).
4) All subsets containing an attribute from a security depen-
dent set and it’s any identifier set are eliminated (lines
(10-16)).
The following parameters of L = (R,F) and S affect the
performance of decomposition algorithm.
• π : #relations ∈ R
• ǫ : maxRi∈R{|Ri|}
• η : maxSi∈S{|Si|}
• µ : maxα∈Si(Si∈S){
∣∣iFα ∣∣}
The algorithm works at a cost of O(π · 2ǫ · η · µ). The
problem is relevant to generating maximal independent sets
problem [24] in an undirected graph, in which attributes can
be thought as vertices and dependencies as edges. In [24] it is
shown that generating maximal independent sets is NP-Hard.
It is important to note that being a proactive solution, the
exponential complexity of decomposition algorithm is not a
critical problem since it is only executed once as preprocessing
phase.
Another point for the decomposition is that, this may lead
to relations with no key and because of that reason, duplicate
rows may occur in views. Handling mechanism for duplicate
rows can change up to the implementation strategy, and keyless
relations are not a problem since they are a fact of anonymity.
V. REAL LIFE EXAMPLE
Consider a retail store database with a logical schema
L = (R,F) as the following three relations in R:
R = {CUSTOMER,PRODUCT,BUY }
CUSTOMER table is used for storing customer details,
PRODUCT table is for product information and BUY
relation stores the purchase transactions of customers. It should
be noted that many tables and attributes that can be useful
for a retail store has been omitted not to overcomplicate the
example.
The relation schemas are given as:
CUSTOMER =


customerId(cid),
name,
surname,
phoneNumber(pNo),
address,
age,
gender


PRODUCT =


productId(pid),
name,
model,
year,
price


BUY =


customerId,
productId,
date,
quantity


F =


cid customer→ name customer,
cid customer→ surname customer,
cid customer→ pNo customer,
cid customer→ address customer,
cid customer→ age customer,
cid customer→ gender customer,
pid product→ name product,
pid product→ model product,
pid product→ year product,
pid product→ price product,

cid buy
pid buy
date buy

→ quantity buy,
cid customer → cid buy,
cid buy → cid customer,
pid product → pid buy,
pid buy → pid product


In addition to these, F is defined as a set of functional de-
pendencies. As given in Definition 2, F includes dependencies
for the foreign keys which are given in bold. It is important that
each foreign key based functional dependency always exists
with its symmetric pair, since the foreign and its relevant key
are the same attribute.
Sample tuples of these three relations are illustrated in
Tables I, II, and III respectively. The fields customerId
and productId are the keys of the CUSTOMER and
PRODUCT relations respectively, and they form a composite
key in the BUY relation together with the date attribute.
TABLE I
CUSTOMER RELATION SAMPLE DATA
cid name surname pNo address age gender
1 John Doe 5555555 NYC 21 M
2 Mary Doe 6666666 NYC 28 F
3 Mary White 7777777 York 28 F
TABLE II
PRODUCT RELATION SAMPLE DATA
pid name model year price
1 PS 3 2012 599,00
2 XBOX 360 2013 799,00
3 PS 4 2014 899,00
TABLE III
BUY RELATION SAMPLE DATA
cid pid date quantity
1 2 20140701-16:28:47 1
1 3 20140702-19:07:11 2
3 3 20140703-12:30:05 2
It should be mentioned that some non-key attributes may
be used as a pseudo-key to recover the original relation after
decomposition. However, that is due to the distribution of data
values and it is not in the scope of our work.
As an application, consider the business development de-
partment of the retail store which checks the BUY relation
and then investigates the correlation among purchases and
customer characteristics as gender and age. However, there
can be a malicious worker in the department who can share
customer details with other stores as customer access infor-
mation. The attributes address and phoneNumber may be
used to present promotions to customer by a different store.
In addition to that, customerId need not to be related with
address and phoneNumber since the department’s major
objective is to use age and gender attributes. To prevent
this situation, following security dependency sets should be
defined.
S =


{
cid buy,
address customer
}
{
cid buy,
pNo customer
}
{
address customer,
age customer
}
{
address customer,
gender customer
}
{
pNo customer,
age customer
}
{
pNo customer,
gender customer
}


It is important to note that to give a single security depen-
dency set as
Sfaulty =




cid buy,
age customer,
gender customer,
address customer,
pNo customer




is an example of faulty definition since decomposition will
not inhibit the inference of association among any two of the
attributes.
To figure out the identifiers, dependencies in F+ should be
reproduced.
1) cid buy → cid customer ∈ F
2) cid customer→


age customer,
gender customer,
address customer,
pNo customer

 ∈ F
3) cid buy →


age customer,
gender customer,
address customer,
pNo customer

 ∈ F+ (transitive
property (1, 2))
As a result of the dependencies in F+, identifier sets are
constructed as follows:
• iFage customer = {{cid buy}, {cid customer}}
• iFgender customer = {{cid buy}, {cid customer}}
• iFaddress customer = {{cid buy}, {cid customer}}
• iFpNo customer = {{cid buy}, {cid customer}}
• iFcid buy = {{cid customer}}
Decomposition Algorithm will work as follows for
CUSTOMER relation:
1) All subsets of attributes in CUSTOMER relation will
be generated (27 = 128 subsets).
2) The subsets which will be removed firstly, are the ones
containing securely dependent attributes such as:
• {cid buy, address customer}
• {cid buy, pNo customer}
• {address customer, age customer}
• {address customer, gender customer}
• {pNo customer, age customer}
• {pNo customer, gender customer}
3) The subsets which will be removed next, are the ones
containing an attribute in a security dependent set with
its identifier such as:
• {cid buy, cid customer}
• {cid buy, address customer}
• {cid buy, pNo customer}
• {cid buy, age customer}
• {cid buy, gender customer}
• {cid customer, address customer}
• {cid customer, pNo customer}
• {cid customer, age customer}
• {cid customer, gender customer}
4) Unnecessary subsets which are composed by other sub-
sets, are also removed.
After decomposition algorithm is applied to the
CUSTOMER relation, the following sub-relations are
going to be obtained.
CUSTOMER1 =


cid,
name,
surname


CUSTOMER2 =


name,
surname,
pNo,
address


CUSTOMER3 =


name,
surname,
gender,
age


It should be noted that name and surname fields are not
keys, if they may perform key-like behavior, then S should be
arranged to compose new security dependent sets considering
name and surname. However it is not in the scope of this
paper to identify key-like behaviour.
TABLE IV
CUSTOMER1 RELATION SAMPLE DATA
cid name surname
1 John Doe
2 Mary Doe
3 Mary White
TABLE V
CUSTOMER2 RELATION SAMPLE DATA
name surname pNo address
John Doe 5555555 NYC
Mary Doe 6666666 NYC
Mary White 7777777 York
TABLE VI
CUSTOMER3 RELATION SAMPLE DATA
name surname age gender
John Doe 21 M
Mary Doe 28 F
Mary White 28 F
Three decomposed relations are given in Tables IV, V and
VI respectively and no decomposition has been made to BUY
and PRODUCT relations. In order to be able to find the
number of customer at each age, CUSTOMER3 relation can
be used. The query is given below:
QUERY-1:
SELECT age, COUNT(*) as ’count’
FROM CUSTOMER3
GROUP BY age
Moreover, name and surname of the customers who has
purchased ”PS” can be found as;
QUERY-2:
SELECT c1.name, c1.surname
FROM CUSTOMER1 c1, BUY b, PRODUCT p
WHERE c1.customerId = b.customerId
and c1.productId = p.productId
and b.name = ’PS’
The result of these two queries are given in Tables VII
and VIII. It should be noted that, any attempt to infer the
association among the attributes of each security dependent
set cannot be done since the decomposed relations containing
the securely dependent attributes cannot be joined on shared
identifiers.
TABLE VII
QUERY1 RESULTING RELATION
age count
21 1
28 2
TABLE VIII
QUERY2 RESULTING RELATION
name surname
John Doe
Mary White
VI. FUTURE WORK
Being the first attempt in the literature to formalize proactive
context dependent attribute based access control, the paper
is touching on many different applicational and theoretical
researches about the subject. Firstly, the way of usage of
this work in the access control mechanisms of database
management systems should be investigated. The proposed
solution could work as a part of a trusted access control system
of a database which has proactive and run-time components.
Moreover, security dependent sets are not the only policy rule
for database access control, it is also left as a future work
for the model and algorithm to be expanded to satisfy all
attribute and row based policy rules. By this generalization,
performance and scalability should be investigated for new
rule types (attribute or row based) about being ”proactive”, as
some modules may be designed to execute in run time. Also it
should be noted that, the last property of secure decomposition
given in Definition 9 should be revisited if the mechanism
employs some run-time components. The property may be
relaxed with some run-time work, as all attributes existing
in a security dependent set should not be made unidentifiable
in advance, since this decision can be made depending on
the query during run time. To sum up, the proposed secure
decomposition solution in this paper performs in a proactive
manner totally, and if future researches will present some run-
time work into the mechanism, then this property of secure
decomposition will be revisited for relaxation by also taking
how performance affected into consideration.
Furthermore, access control strategy should be extended to
data insertion or update policies according to the security
dependencies. For this issue, implementation alternatives of
the proposed solution should be defined, and data modification
strategy with proactive and run-time components should be
suggested accordingly. In addition to that, the changes done
to the secure logical schema during run-time are another
challenge for that paper which should be dealt in future. The
modification may be an alternation of any relational schema,
meanwhile, the functional dependencies may also be changed
according to the relational schema. These changes will be
expected to cause modifications to security dependent sets and
it should be clearly examined how to handle these types of
modifications for the proposed model.
Lastly, some practical applications of this work can be
proposed in future. One of them is an applicational module,
which inputs current external logical schema with security
dependent sets of each user role and investigates whether the
external schema has any security leak for any defined roles.
This application can be useful in current database management
systems for a verification of access control mechanism. Beside
this, another application can be built to determine the allowed
inferences of associations among attributes for any roles, since
it is important to clarify what is allowed as what is inhibited in
an access control strategy. This application can be used for a
cross control for the design and requirements of an application.
VII. CONCLUSION
The given theorem, algorithm and examples in this paper
aims a construct proactive context dependent attribute based
security mechanism schema for database users, using given
security dependent sets. The main objective in this work is
to prevent inference of association of the attributes in each
security dependent set, and this is accomplished by performing
a secure decomposition which transforms the relevant logical
schema to a secure logical schema for which it is proven to be
impossible to infer association among any security dependent
set. Furthermore, an algorithm is proposed and proven to
perform secure decomposition. It should be noted that all
work in this paper are about building the external schema of
the database according to the given logical schema (including
relational schemas and functional dependencies) and security
dependent sets, and it can be implemented independently from
conceptual and physical model. As a result, different external
schemas for all different roles of users in database has been
achieved, and each role can access to the database through
a different view from the point of security. By this work,
granularity problem for access control methods for databases
has been addressed and a formal context dependent proactive
access control method has been proposed to be used in access
control mechanisms of database management systems.
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APPENDICES
The step by step proofs are given below with a brief
description of each step.
Proof For Theorem-1
Proof:
1) Assuming L as a secure logical schema, the formula
given in (8) should be satisfied.
∀Si((Si ∈ S)⇒ ∀Rj(Rj ∈ R
+ ⇒ Si 6⊆ Rj))
2) Let Si be a security dependent set for L.
Si ∈ S
3) Line (1) can be instantiated by using Si.
(Si ∈ S)⇒ ∀Rj(Rj ∈ R+ ⇒ Si 6⊆ Rj)
4) When modus ponens is applied using lines (2) and (3).
∀Rj(Rj ∈ R+ ⇒ Si 6⊆ Rj)
5) Bu using the formula (1) of the property of R+, Si
should not be element of any existing relation R and
there should not exist any attibute set to which Si is
functionally dependent since according to line (4), Si is
not a part of any relation in R+ so any new relation
composing Si should not be produced by meaningful
joins.
∀Rk(Rk ∈ R ⇒ Si 6⊆ Rk) ∧ ∀Al(Al ⊆ UR ⇒ (Al →
Si) 6∈ F+)
6) Assume that the inference of association among the
attributes in Si can be done. This assumption is the
negation of the theorem 1, so proof by contradiction
starts here.
XL(Si)
7) According to line (6), the formula (7) states that Si
should be inferable or subset of any existing relation
in R.
∃An(An
F
⇒ Si∧An ⊆ UR)∨∃Ro(Ro ∈ R∧Si ⊆ Ro)
8) In order to contradict the ∨ expression in line (7), both
sides of ∨ should be contradicted. Accordingly, the first
assumption is given below as Si should be inferable.
∃An(An
F
⇒ Si ∧ An ⊆ UR)
9) Let the expression in line (8) be instantiated using bound
variable An denoting a attribute set which infers Si.
An
F
⇒ Si ∧ An ⊆ UR
10) First ∧ instantiation using line (9).
An
F
⇒ Si
11) Second ∧ instantiation using line (5).
∀Al(Al ⊆ UR ⇒ (Al → Si) 6∈ F+)
12) The universal quantifier in line (11) is instantiated using
An
An ⊆ UR ⇒ (An → Si) 6∈ F+
13) Second ∧ instantiation using line (9).
An ⊆ UR
14) When modus ponens is applied using lines (12) and (13).
(An → Si) 6∈ F+
15) Line (14) can be used to perform modus ponens to the
contrapositive of formula (6).
¬(An
F
⇒ Si), (14) using formula 6
16) Lines (10) and (15) are leading to a contradiction.
⊥
17) First assumption of ∨ expression in line (7) in line (8)
has been contradicted. Next, the second assumption is
given below as Si should be a part of an existing relation.
∃Ro(Ro ∈ R ∧ Si ⊆ Ro)
18) First ∧ instantiation using line (5).
∀Rk(Rk ∈ R ⇒ Si 6⊆ Rk)
19) The existential quantifier in line (17) is instantiated using
bounded variable Ro.
Ro ∈ R∧ Si ⊆ Ro, let Ro be a bound variable for Ro
20) Line (18) can be instatiated again by using Ro.
Ro ∈ R ⇒ Si 6⊆ Ro
21) First ∧ instantiation using line (19).
Ro ∈ R
22) Second ∧ instantiation using line (19).
Si ⊆ Ro
23) When modus ponens is applied using lines (20) and (21).
Si 6⊆ Ro, (20, 21)
24) Lines (22) and (23) are leading to a contradiction for
line (17).
⊥
25) Lines (16) and (24) are leading to a contradiction for
line (7) which means that it is impossible to make an
inference of association among the attributes in Si.
⊥
26) End of proof by contradiction is reached, hence the
theorem holds.
¬XL(Si)
Proof For Theorem-2
Proof:
1) Assume that L′ is a secure logical schema, then it should
satisfy the following property given in formula (9).
∀Si(Si ∈ S)⇒ ¬XL′(Si)
2) Let Si be a security dependent set for L′.
Si ∈ S
3) Line (1) can be instantiated by using Si.
(Si ∈ S)⇒ ¬XL′(Si)
4) When modus ponens is applied using lines (2) and (3).
¬XL′(Si)
5) Proof by contradiction begins by assuming negation
of line (4) as if L′ is not a secure logical schema,
then inference of association among the attributes of a
security dependent set (Si) should be possible according
to theorem (1).
XL′(Si)
6) According to line (5), the formula (7) states that Si
should be inferable or subset of any existing relation
in R.
∃An(An
F
′
⇒ Si∧An ⊆ UR′)∨∃Ro(Ro ∈ R
′∧Si ⊆ Ro)
7) Let the expression in line (6) be instantiated using bound
variable An denoting a attribute set which infers Si and
Ro denoting the relation which contains Si.
(An
F
′
⇒ Si ∧ An ⊆ UR′) ∨ (Ro ∈ R
′ ∧ Si ⊆ Ro)
8) In order to contradict the ∨ expression in line (7), both
sides of ∨ should be contradicted. Accordingly, the first
assumption is given below.
(An
F
′
⇒ Si ∧ An ⊆ UR′)
9) First ∧ instantiation using line (8).
An
F
′
⇒ Si, (8)
10) Formula (6) states that Si should be functionally depen-
dent to an attribute set when the statement in line (9)
exists.
(An → Si) ∈ F ′
+
11) Using formula (11), the dependency in line (10) can be
transformed as below.
(An → Si) ∈ F+
12) Si in line (11) cannot be contained by An as partial
functional dependencies are excluded in definition of
F+ in Definition (3).
An 6⊇ Si
13) Using lines (11) and (12), it can be stated that An is an
identifier set for Si according to formula (3).
An ∈ IFSi
14) If L′ is a secure logical schema, then formula (13)
should be satisfied.
∀Si ∈ S, ∀Ri ∈ R′, ∀σ ∈ Si, ∄τ ∈ iFσ (({σ} ∪ τ) ⊆ Ri)
15) There should not be any identifier for Si according to
the contrpositive of Identifiable Property’s formula (5)
and line (14) since it is prevented for any attribute in Si
to be in the same relation with an identifier.
IFSi = ∅
16) An cannot be an identifier according to line (15).
An 6∈ IFSi
17) Lines (13) and (16) are leading to a contradiction.
⊥
18) First assumption of ∨ expression in line (7) in line (8)
has been contradicted. Next, the second assumption is
given below as Si should be a part of an existing relation.
(Ro ∈ R′ ∧ Si ⊆ Ro)
19) Second ∧ instantiation using line (18).
Si ⊆ Ro
20) First ∧ instantiation using line (18).
Ro ∈ R′
21) Si cannot be part of any relation according to formula
(12).
Si 6⊆ Ro
22) Lines (19) and (21) are leading to a contradiction.
⊥
23) Lines (17) and (22) are leading to a contradiction for
line (5) which means that it is impossible to make an
inference of association among the attributes in Si.
⊥
24) End of proof by contradiction is reached, hence the
theorem holds.
¬XL′(Si)
